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Ransomware security incidents have become one of the biggest threats to general 
computer users who are oblivious to the ease of infection, severity, and cost of the 
damage it causes. University networks and their students are susceptible to ransomware 
security incidents. College students have vast technical skills and knowledge, however 
they risk ransomware security incidents because of their lack of mitigating actions to the 
threats and the belief that it would not happen to them. Interaction with peers may play a 
part in college students’ perception of the threats and behavior to secure their computers. 
Identifying what influences students’ threat avoidance behavior in the face of 
ransomware security incidents is essential to managing students’ behaviors to protect 
their personal and university computer systems. The goal of this research is to empirically 
examine threat avoidance behavior in the context of ransomware security incidents 
among college students. The research model extends the Technology Threat Avoidance 
Theory with the addition of the factors of subjective norm, attitude toward knowledge 
sharing, and experience of threat. The study focuses on the effects these factors have on 
threat avoidance behavior. These factors determine if externalities such as social 
pressures or previous experiences of threat influence avoidance behavior. 
 
This study was a quantitative and empirical study using a non-probability design for 
gathering data. The convenience sampling method was used to collect data using a survey 
instrument. The items of the survey instrument were designed using the 7-point Likert 
Scale. The data was collected from 174 United States college students using an online 
survey tool. Prior to the main data collection effort, an expert panel review and a pilot 
study were conducted. Pre-analysis data screening was conducted before analyzing the 
data. Data analysis with survey data was conducted using Partial Least Square Structural 
Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) using SmartPLS 3.0. 
 
The results of the study showed a positive and significant relationship between avoidance 
motivation and threat avoidance behavior. Subjective norm was found to have a positive 
effect on attitude towards knowledge sharing. However, the relationship between 
subjective norm and response efficacy was not significant. The study contributes to the 
body of knowledge by providing empirical evidence about the effect of factors of threat 
avoidance behavior on ransomware security incidents among college students. It provides 
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Background / Introduction  
According to Fimin (2017), in 2016 half of all the companies in the United States had 
their systems infected by a type of ransomware with many of them paying the hackers an 
average ransom of $2,500. The author also pointed to a Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) study that calculated the total cost of these ransoms at $1 billion during 2016.  
Yan et al. (2018) argue that students have unsafe computer behaviors; students tend to 
trust most communications such as emails as long as they came from close friends.  Yan 
et al. (2018) also found that even students with computer security knowledge and skills 
would choose to ignore good security practices.  
Stanciu and Tinca (2016) demonstrated that students falsely believed they had above 
average computer security knowledge. However, Scheponik et al. (2016) found that 
students lack the skills and knowledge to protect their computers from security threats. 
Students in the study felt comfortable with the level of safety provided by the most basic 
of computer security solutions. For example, some students felt secure using encryption 
alone and did not understand that good security requires multiple tools and methods. The 
students also had difficulty understanding the difference between authentication and 
authorization. According to Zhang-Kennedy et al. (2018), students from a university 





against such an attack and were indifferent towards increasing their cybersecurity skills 
and knowledge.  
 
Problem Statement 
Ransomware has grown exponentially since Dr. Joseph Popp created and distributed 
the first ransomware in 1989 (Nadir & Bakhshi, 2018). According to O'Gorman et al. 
(2019), they detected nearly 545,000 ransomware attacks in 2018; 81% of which affected 
enterprise users. Ransomware has become more sophisticated, harder to detect, and easier 
to spread in a local network (O'Gorman et al., 2019). Sultan, Khalique, Alam, and 
Tanweer (2018) state that from 2015 to 2016, the United States was the target of 28% of 
all ransomware attacks and more than 50% of affected users were consumers. The 
authors also mention that during 2016, the average affected user paid $1,000 to recover 
their files. 
Zhang-Kennedy et al. (2018) found that students of ransomware affected universities 
were worried about cybersecurity shortly after the attack and some even began taking 
concrete steps to have recent backups; a peak of 78% of students began making data 
backups. However, as time passed, cybersecurity concerns decreased. In addition, 57% of 
the students thought the university could have prevented the ransomware attack. These 
same students decided to ignore cybersecurity education material because they felt there 
was little they could do to protect their systems against ransomware.  
This study examined the effect of the knowledge sharing attitude of college students 





students share security incident experiences with each other as this organic exchange of 
knowledge may protect the group more efficiently. 
The accumulation of firsthand knowledge, also known as experience, is of utmost 
importance when facing a threat (Venkatesh, Brown, Maruping, & Bala, 2008). 
Experience of threat is not necessarily a given; especially among risk prone students who 
believe they are invincible (van Schaik et al., 2017). It is important to understand how the 
experience of threat affects threat avoidance behavior.  
Liang and Xue investigated the relationships around threat avoidance behavior. Liang 
and Xue (2009) created the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT), while the 
study of Liang and Xue (2010) validated the TTAT and tried to understand how it works. 
Liang and Xue (2010)’s study was done with a small group of college students. The 
authors also mention that the sources of threats and safeguards can be changed, while 
also suggesting the effect of emotion in the model. The TTAT is a very flexible 
framework. Liang and Xue (2010) state that it can be used to study several threats and 
mitigating actions. They recommend that future research could be done with coping 
based mitigating actions. 
Ng and Rahim (2005) studied the home user’s intention to practice computer security. 
Building their study on the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), one of the factors they 
focused on was the subjective norm. Their study concluded that subjective norm did in 
fact play a part in the user’s decision to practice computer security. Chi, Yeh, and Hung 
(2012) studied the effect of subjective norm on a user’s perceived risk and usage 
intention towards cloud computing services. They found that the influence of subjective 





Attitude toward knowledge sharing is important in a group facing a threat and is 
derived from the attitude in the TPB (Ajzen, 1991). Zhang, Tsang, Yue, and Chau (2015) 
argue there are similarities in how computer security experts and general topic online 
learning communities share information amongst themselves. The authors observed that 
those who are inexperienced remain as observers, while expert hackers share more 
knowledge and advice with inexperienced hackers. Also, less experienced hackers tend to 
ask questions and share more about their experience in search of guidance. The authors 
conclude that even in the anarchical world of hackers, online communities have a 
structure like any other merit-based learning community.  
The volatile mix of modern ransomware and the apparent ignorance or indifference 
from college students is dangerous to college networks (Zhang-Kennedy et al., 2018). 
The study tests the relationship among the factors affecting threat avoidance behavior on 
ransomware security incidents among college students. College students have vast 
technical skills and knowledge. However, they risk ransomware security incidents 
because of their lack of mitigating actions to the threats and the belief that it will not 
happen to them. The peculiarities of young adults and their risk prone behavior pose a 
risk to their personal systems and their university’s networks. We currently do not know 
the factors influencing college students’ security behavior involving interaction with 
peers. How college students’ threat avoidance behavior is influenced, and by which 
factors, needs to be studied to understand how to mitigate the risks. Research into 
Information Technology (IT) threat avoidance behavior has mostly focused on enterprise 







The research goal was to empirically examine a research model of threat avoidance 
behavior in the context of ransomware security incidents among college students. The 
model extended the TTAT by Liang and Xue (2010)  with three additional factors - 
subjective norm, attitude toward knowledge sharing, and experience of threat - and 




1. How does subjective norm affect the attitude toward knowledge sharing among peers 
following a ransomware security incident?  
2. How does the experience of threat affect the perceived threat when a user discovers a 
peer has been infected by ransomware?  
3. How does attitude toward knowledge sharing affect perceived susceptibility threat 
following a ransomware security incident? 
4. How does subjective norm affect a user’s response efficacy following a ransomware 
security incident?  
5. How does perceived threat affect a user’s avoidance motivation following a 
ransomware security incident?  
6. How does coping appraisal affect a user’s avoidance motivation following a 
ransomware security incident?  
7. How does avoidance motivation affect a user’s threat avoidance behavior following a 






The research empirically examined a research model of threat avoidance behavior. 
The research model shown in Figure 1, represents factors that influence threat avoidance 
behavior and variables used to test the hypothesis. 
 
Figure 1. Research model of Threat Avoidance Behavior 
Subjective norm has a positive effect on attitude toward knowledge sharing as the 
greater subjective norms  lead to greater sharing (Tu, Turel, Yuan, & Archer, 2015). 
Bock, Zmud, Kim, and Lee (2005) also found that subjective norms had a positive effect 
on the attitude toward knowledge sharing. There is also a positive attitude toward 
information sharing if there is a subjective norm among the immediate social group, 
which will encourage a greater exchange of information among the individuals 
(Jarvenpaa & Staples, 2000). Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed:  
H1: Subjective Norm has a positive effect on Attitude toward Knowledge Sharing. 





































The construct experience of threat is positively associated with perceived 
susceptibility and perceived severity, since having experience with a threat increases the 
user’s perception that the threat can happen again to a greater degree than the first time. 
Individuals who go through a negative experience have a higher probability of being 
hypervigilant to that vulnerability in future situations (Tu et al., 2015). Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is developed: 
H2: Experience of Threat has a positive effect on Perceived Severity. 
H3: Experience of Threat has a positive effect on Perceived Susceptibility. 
Attitude toward knowledge sharing is positively associated with perceived 
susceptibility as more shared information about threats possibly increase the user’s 
perceptions that something can happen (Bock et al., 2005). This construct captures how 
willing an individual is to share their knowledge with others. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is developed: 
H4: Attitude toward Knowledge Sharing has a positive effect on Perceived Susceptibility. 
Social influence or pressure has been shown to affect the threat avoidance behavior of 
information system users as people function most of the time as part of social units 
(Liang & Xue, 2009). Humans are social animals, and their behavior would be constantly 
affected by the actions and beliefs of other humans. The authors observed that most users 
would eventually fall in line and conform to behaviors that are acceptable to the rest of 
their social group. Social influences not only pressure users into behaving in one way or 
another but also provide them with valuable information about what is acceptable by their 
current group (Liang & Xue, 2009). This information may help the user predict the risks 





Taylor and Todd (1995) argue that behavioral intentions are highly likely to be preceded 
by subjective norms.  
The construct subjective norm has a larger effect when the individual has little 
experience and has yet to adopt a certain attitude (Chua, 1980). Subjective norm is a 
determinant of intention and has an indirect but significant effect on behavior (Taylor & 
Todd, 1995). Also, Tu et al. (2015) argue that social influences directly influence an 
individual’s coping intentions.  y increasing the individual’s threat perceptions, 
subjective norms push them to find way to mitigate the perceived threat (Tu et al., 2015). 
Chi et al. (2012) argue that subjective norm has a greater influence on individuals that 
perceived risk. Individuals yield to society and group pressures to use a system even if 
they perceive that system to be at risk. Individuals, for the most part, follow the observed 
behavior of their immediate environment and group (Chan, Woon, & Kankanhalli, 2005). 
 ince sub ective norm affects an individual’s behavior, there should be a relationship 
with how said individual reacts or behaves when facing the threat of ransomware. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H5: Subjective Norm has a positive effect on Response Efficacy. 
As per the model by (Liang & Xue, 2010), the constructs of coping appraisal and 
perceived threat have a positive association with avoidance motivation to threat 
avoidance behavior. (Liang & Xue, 2010) empirically proved that individuals would be 
motivated to avoid a threat if they have an elevated level of self-efficacy. Also, they 
found that avoidance motivation has a significant influence on threat avoidance behavior. 





H6: Perceived Severity has a positive effect on Avoidance Motivation.  
H7: Perceived Susceptibility has a positive effect on Avoidance Motivation. 
H8: Self-Efficacy has a positive effect on Avoidance Motivation.  
H9: Response Efficacy has a positive effect on Avoidance Motivation.  
H10: Avoidance Motivation has a positive effect on Threat Avoidance Behavior.  
 
Relevance and Significance 
The results of the research contribute to the body of knowledge by providing 
empirical evidence about the effect of factors of threat avoidance behavior on 
ransomware security incidents among college students. 
Scheponik et al. (2016) argue that students are an important threat vector. The authors 
point out that a significant number of college students, either by ignorance or over-
confidence, do not have the technical knowledge to understand basic security topics. The 
adage that students cannot see the forest for the trees holds true with students as they are 
not able to see the big picture of the threat posed by ransomware. Most students feel 
confident with only one threat mitigation solution (Scheponik et al., 2016).  
Stanciu and Tinca (2016) stated that universities are concerned with the lack of risk 
awareness shown by a significant number of students. Universities are becoming aware 
of the security risks that companies face today and are interested in creating curriculums 
and preparing future professionals that have basic security knowledge. The study by 
(Stanciu & Tinca, 2016) also revealed that almost 3/4th of the students surveyed know of 
a friend that has had a security breach. However, even with the knowledge that a friend or 





computers would be targeted by hackers. A large majority of these same students believe 
that having an antivirus is not enough protection. However, that same group uses only an 
antivirus for computer threat protection.  
The study provides greater practical insight into how college students are reacting to 
ever more common ransomware-based security threats. This new information helps 
universities know where and how to better focus their risk awareness training. This effort 
should trickle down the workforce into the industry as security-aware students become 
professionals that understand the risks and have the right motivations to follow the 
security policies in their workplaces.  
Also, the TTAT is a flexible and reliable framework. However, there is not a lot of 
scientific literature using the TTAT to study student threat avoidance behavior as most 
studies tend to focus on company employees. Also, extending the TTAT with constructs 
that focus on social connections and interactions adds the component of human 
interconnectivity that has been modifying our behavior since the start of the social media 
age. This hyper connected age we live in, where we are not just influenced by our next-
door neighbor but by friends a world apart brings new variables that are interesting to 
study. Before social media, college students would have known only of the ransomware 
breach of their roommate but in today’s world, they will find out about dozens or 
hundreds of breaches around their local campus or friends in other campuses of their 








Barriers and Issues  
This study used a survey instrument as the main tool to gather the data. The use of a 
survey instrument creates various risks. First, surveys depend on the participant’s honesty 
and desire to share accurate personal information. Second, the questionnaires were 
distributed through the Internet using Google Forms. This means participants answered 
the survey by themselves without any assistance or opportunity to ask questions or 
clarification of key terms. This research method required clear and precise questions that 
had to be clearly understood by a pool of participants with diverse demographic 
backgrounds. Since the survey was sent electronically, there is no assurance everyone 
will fill out their survey. However, at the same time, using an online survey reduced the 
possibility of errors when exporting the results to the analysis software. 
McCormac et al. (2017) warned that depending on self-reporting may result in data 
collection problems. The authors argued that due to the subjective nature of self-
reporting, the data could have measurement errors. To mitigate data collection problems, 
they recommended not asking participants their name or their employer’s name. They 




The study relies on a survey instrument to gather the data. It is assumed that the 
participants followed an honor code and provided answers that were as truthful and 
demonstrated the closest representation of their beliefs and experiences as possible within 





participants had some knowledge or experience with information systems and had some 
basic understanding of the computer and security related terms used in the survey items. 
 
Limitations  
As the study was only to be shared with college student listservers from schools 
within the United States, this affects the generalization of the study regarding students 
from other countries and outside the traditional college student age group. Also, 
distributing the study via an online survey method may have affected the survey results. 
Students who have more technical knowledge are more likely to be part of the listservers 
that were used for the distribution and are more likely to answer an online survey. 
 
Delimitations  
Due to a large number of constructs and research questions in the model, the survey 
turned out long and was a reason to contemplate giving participants a reward for 
completing it. The survey questions were written in a clear and precise manner. The use 
of a panel of experts and a pilot study helped to validate a survey that had a reasonable 
length, with questions that were clear and precise, and provided the needed result data.  
Shneiderman et al. (2017) argue that survey instruments should be pilot tested before 
gathering the main research data. According to the authors, a pilot test is the best way to 








Definition of Terms  
Subjective Norm: According to Ng and Rahim (2005), it is what a person perceives as 
the social pressures that influence him to perform a given action.  
Attitude Towards Knowledge Sharing: Bock et al. (2005) define it as how inclined a 
person is to share their knowledge with others.  
Experience of Threat: Venkatesh et al. (2008) define it as an increased familiarity with 
a negative behavior or action.  
Perceived Susceptibility: Liang and Xue (2009) define it as how probable a user was to 
be affected in a negative manner by an IS threat. 
Perceived Severity: Liang and Xue (2009) define it as the perception of the user 
concerning the severity of the results of the IS threat.  
Self-Efficacy: Ng and Rahim (2005) define it as the confidence a user has in his or her 
own ability to execute the threat mitigation processes.  
Response Efficacy: Witte (1992) define it as how much an individual believes that a 
threat mitigation action will be effective against a specific threat.  
Avoidance Motivation: Liang and Xue (2010) define it as how motivated a user will be 
to avoid an IT threat by performing or using the safeguarding measure or methods.  
Threat Avoidance Behavior: Liang and Xue (2010) define it as a behavior or process 
that keeps the user in a specific security state the farthest away from an end state with an 








List of Acronyms 
AVE: Averaged Variance Extracted 
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation  
IT: Information Technology 
IS: Information Systems  
PLS: Partial Least Squares 
TPB: Theory of Planned Behavior  
TTAT: Technology Threat Avoidance Theory 
 
Summary 
The focus of the chapter is presenting and arguing for the validity of the research 
problem. It is argued that the examination factors influencing college students’ security 
behavior involving interaction with peers should be studied. The problem necessitated the 
goal of empirically examining a research model of threat avoidance behavior in the 
context of ransomware security incidents among college students. This was studied by 
extending the TTAT with the factors subjective norm, attitude toward knowledge sharing, 
and experience of threat. A series of research questions and hypotheses were developed 
to test the extended model and its validity in answering the problem. Also, arguments 
were presented supporting the significance of why the study should be done. Finally, the 












Review of the Literature 
 
Theory 
The model is derived from the work done mainly by Liang and Xue (2010) which is 
built on Liang and Xue (2009). The research by Liang and Xue (2009) had the goal of 
building a model to understand the Information System (IS)  threat avoidance behaviors 
exhibited by users of personal computers. From this study a model based on the TTAT 
was developed and empirically validated. The authors observed that avoidance 
motivation provides a satisfactory way to predict users’ I  threat avoidance behavior. 
They concluded that avoidance motivation was affected by the constructs perceived 
threat, safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, and self-efficacy. Liang and Xue (2010) 
found that users only have threat perception if they think there is a real IS threat and that 
the threat has credible and negative consequences on their system.  
The TTAT has the benefit that it is a general framework that has been found to be an 
effective way to explain the security related behaviors of IS users, even outside the 
enterprise setting. The TTAT models how users perceive the existence of a threat and 
what is the proper response to avoid it according to the available mitigation tools and 
actions. The model showed that users could be motivated by a perceived threat if the 
users are given insight on the magnitude of the damage the threat can cause and the 





In addition, two constructs are taken from the TPB: attitude toward knowledge 
sharing and subjective norm. Attitude toward knowledge sharing is derived from the 
attitude in the TPB (Ajzen, 1991). In comparison, the subjective norm is derived from the 
work of Ng and Rahim (2005). Ajzen (1991) stated that attitude was a strong predictor of 
a person’s intentions. According to their study, the personal aspect that attitude brings 
helps it become an even stronger factor than the sub ective norm over a person’s 
behavior. Ajzen (1991) argues that unlike other frameworks, the role of the TPB is to 
explain why humans behave in a certain way.  
 
Constructs 
Subjective norm is a construct derived from the TPB. It is what people perceive as the 
social pressures that influence them to perform or not to perform a given action (Ng & 
Rahim, 2005). Subjective norms affect attitude toward knowledge sharing in a positive 
manner (Bock et al., 2005; Tu et al., 2015). There is a greater chance of exchange of 
information among individuals and thus a positive effect on the attitude toward 
information sharing if there is a subjective norm among an immediate social group. 
 Chan et al. (2005) argue that on average, individuals observe behavioral signals of 
others around them and imitate or follow that behavior. This herd behavior is amplified 
when the observing individual has little experience (Chua, 1980). Taylor and Todd 
(1995) called subjective norm a determinant behavior and argued that although it has an 
indirect effect on behavior, the effect was significant, and it is likely that subjective 





Liang and Xue (2009) observed that subjective norm pressure and influence people 
but at the same time, it provides vital information that in prehistoric times could have 
meant the difference between life or death for the human. When humans observe others, 
they learn what behaviors, on average, would likely help them survive. Liang and Xue 
(2009) stated that these social pressures affect threat avoidance behavior and may help IS 
users predict the possible risks of any one of their actions and help them discern which 
mitigating action might produce the best result. In agreement with this finding, Tu et al. 
(2015) argued that an individual’s coping intentions would be directly affected by social 
pressures. The authors also argue that when an individual’s threat perception increases, 
the subjective norms act as a force that guides them to find a way to mitigate the 
perceived threat. However, the subjective norm can have a negative effect on human 
behavior. Chi et al. (2012) argued that subjective norms have a larger effect on a user’s 
decision-making process than even perceived risk. Under enough pressure from their 
social group, some users yield and accept the use of systems or methods that they 
themselves perceived as risky. 
In the TPB, attitude is defined as the general evaluation a person has of a given 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991). This is remarkably like attitude towards knowledge sharing. 
Attitude towards knowledge sharing has a positive association with perceived severity 
and perceived susceptibility. According to Bock et al. (2005), as more information is 
shared about a threat, there would be a probable increase in a user’s perception of that 
threat’s certainty of happening.   
Tu et al. (2015) argued that going through negative experiences can increase the 





Users that have undergone a negative experience in the information systems domain 
would be more aware of the vulnerability in the future. When experience is gained, 
uncertainty is reduced, and the person would have a better sense of control over that 
behavior or action. Also, a person’s behaviors and actions become more intentional as 
experience is gained (Venkatesh et al., 2008). Experience of threat has a positive 
association with perceived susceptibility and perceived severity. 
Liang and Xue (2009) described both perceived susceptibility and perceived severity 
in their model. They defined perceived susceptibility as how probable a user was to be 
affected in a negative manner by an IS threat. Perceived severity was defined as the 
perception of the user concerning the severity of the results of the IS threat. Also, users 
will begin searching for strategies to mitigate or cope with a potential threat as soon as 
the user perceives the threat (Liang & Xue, 2009). Liang and Xue (2010) demonstrate 
that the meta-constructs coping appraisal and perceived threat both have a positive effect 
on avoidance motivation.  
According to Ng and Rahim (2005), self-efficacy can be defined as the confidence a 
user has in his or her own ability to execute the threat mitigation processes. While 
Johnston and Warkentin (2010) define it as how much the user thinks he or she has the 
required skill to execute recommended actions. Liang and Xue (2009) observed that if a 
user had a higher level of self-efficacy in the required method of guarding against IS 
threats, then the user would be more motivated to use the recommended method and 
protect himself against the potential threat. Liang and Xue (2010) show that self-efficacy 





Witte (1992) defines response efficacy as how effective an individual believes that a 
threat mitigation action is against a specific threat.  he higher a person’s response 
efficacy, the more probable it is that the person will use a recommended action to defend 
against the perceived threat (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). This means that response 
efficacy has a positive effect on avoidance motivation.  
Liang and Xue (2010) define avoidance motivation as to how motivated a user avoids 
an IT threat by performing or using the safeguarding measure or methods. While Chen 
and Zahedi (2016), on the other hand, define avoidance as when users take actions such 
as reducing their Internet use to avoid security threats.  
 Building on the cybernetic theory of Edwards (1992), threat avoidance behavior is 
defined by Liang and Xue (2010) as behavior or process that keeps the user in a specific 
security state the farthest away from an end state with an increased threat level. Their 
study shows that avoidance behavior has a significant positive effect on threat avoidance 
behavior. Threat avoidance behavior is also part of a group of behaviors also known as 
adaptive coping. The behavior is described as one where the subject mitigates the threat 
in an effective manner (Chenoweth, Gattiker, & Corral, 2019).  
 
Ransomware Threat 
Since the first ransomware attack in 1989, the threat has become more dangerous and 
complex. During that first attack, the program would encrypt your files after the 90th 
computer reboot. It then went on to ask the user for a ransom of $189 and provided an 





ransomware is more complex, easier to hide, and faster to distribute through a victim’s 
computer networks (Nadir & Bakhshi, 2018).  
Modern ransomware is not simply a single independent program that a victim 
downloads and that infects their computer, home, or office network and computers. 
Ransomware now depends on a complete infrastructure of VPNs, proxies, servers, and 
webhosts that are willing to look away while their networks are used for criminal acts 
(Richardson & North, 2017). According to Nadir and Bakhshi (2018), 57% of 
ransomware victims are now home users. These users are threatened and blackmailed not 
just with losing their encrypted data but also with the release of embarrassing photos or 
documents that will be made public or sent to their close friends and families. This 
change in targeting more individual users than enterprises, has to do with hacking groups 
noticing that individual users are more likely to pay the ransom and not inform the 
authorities. Individuals affected by ransomware pay an average of $300 for the key to 
decrypt their data (Richardson & North, 2017). The authors also note that ransomware 
hackers began using a dynamic pricing scheme that calculates ransoms according to the 
victim’s country. This technique helps the hackers maximize the ransoms paid and has 
allowed them to target poorer countries in the third world by asking for ransoms that are 
within the economic reality of the target’s location.  
Han, Hoe, Wing, and Brohi (2017) mention that the WannaCry ransomware infected 
more than 200,000 computers in 150 countries. The authors note that in general, people 
do not report infections. The scare tactics and threats of releasing personal information 
keep many individual users from going to the authorities and reporting that they were 





users were infected while accessing sites that promised free movie streaming, trying to 
download through p2p services such as BitTorrent, or through phishing links.  
The spread of modern ransomware is quick. Most of the newest and most aggressive 
ransomware encrypts not just the initial computer where the file was downloaded but also 
any other computer connected to the local network (Han et al., 2017). The authors 
recommend that individual users should be made aware of the dangers posed by 
ransomware and that best practices to protect themselves should be spread to social 
media.  
 
University Information System Vulnerability 
The WannaCry ransomware affected 150 universities around the world (Mohurle & 
Patil, 2017). University networks are especially vulnerable to computer security threats 
like ransomware. The network topography, campus size, and diverse userbase make 
university networks difficult to protect (Singh, Joshi, & Gaud, 2016). According to 
Patyal, Sampalli, Ye, and Rahman (2017), the University of Calgary was hit with 
ransomware once. Administration and faculty could not use their computers and students 
were ordered not to connect to the school’s wireless Internet. The school paid the 
attackers a ransom of $15,000. Even after having paid the ransom and receiving the 
decryption keys, it took the University IT specialists ten days to repair the damage done 
and bring up the school’s computer network and systems again.  
Singh et al. (2016) warn that university computer networks have diverse attack 
vectors that are hard to defend due to several factors. First, university networks are 





security is even more complex when several geographically distant campuses are joined 
under a wide area network configuration. Also, some large university departments want 
to have their own locally managed decentralized internal network. This adds complexity 
to a network that needs to provide access to students, administrative staff, and professors; 
each with their own needs and permissions. In this environment, a ransomware infection 
from a student’s personal computer infects a large part of the university’s network within 
minutes.  
Joshi and Singh (2017) argued that a university’s computer system environment has 
different attack vectors than the networks of other large enterprises such as banks. They 
also argue that the current security guidelines used by universities are not effective in 
defending against modern threats such as ransomware. 
 
College Student Information System Threat Behavior 
Howarth (2014) argued that 95% of all computer security incidents are caused by 
errors rooted in the human factor. Diaz, Sherman, and Joshi (2020) studied how college 
students would respond to phishing attempts. In the phishing test, the authors found that 
92% of the students opened the email and 59% of those who opened the email went on to 
click the link. The authors then compared how the clicking rate varied across the different 
schools and departments of the university. The Non-STEM students had higher click 
rates than the STEM students. And within the STEM students, the Engineering and 
Computer related majors had the lowest click rates.  
Diaz et al. (2020) also observed older students clicked less on the phishing email than 





among the genders. Finally, they concluded that student’s general lack of awareness of 
phishing emails might be problematic for universities’ I  security. Also, the authors 
believe the students may have been overstating their knowledge as there was a 































A quantitative method is used for this study. The data was gathered using a survey 
instrument which was developed by combining items from surveys that have been 
empirically validated by previous studies. This new survey was used to gather the data 
required to study the effects of the factors that influence the threat avoidance behavior in 
ransomware security incidents among college students. The survey method allows for a 
fast and efficient means of gathering information. Using electronic surveys provides 
benefits similar to those of postal surveys, including the reduction of bias. Since, there 
would not be an opportunity to explain the instructions or clarify definitions to the 
volunteer in person, the questions must be straightforward (Holt, 1997).  
 
Development of Survey Instrument 
The survey used the 7-point Likert scale, as it could be more precise than other scales 
(A. Joshi, Kale, Chandel, & Pal, 2015). They mention that 7-point scales give participants 
more options and this means that people would be most likely to find the answer closest 
to their individual perception of the situation in the questionnaire. The only exception is 





Table 1 outlines the 48 survey items developed to measure the degrees of the 
constructs in the study. The construct name and an abbreviation for each item are given. 
Also, the descriptions are the actual item statements that were answered by the 
participants. Lastly, Table 1 includes the citation of the source from where the survey 
item is taken and the construct’s composite reliability, which measures the internal 
consistency.  
Table 1 
Survey Items Descriptions and Sources 






(Bock et al., 
2005) 
0.8230 
SN1 My university IT Dept thinks that I should 




SN2 My professors think that I should share my 




SN3 My friends think I should share my anti-
ransomware knowledge with other students. 
 
  
SN4 Generally speaking, I try to follow the 
University’s I  security policy and intention. 
 
  
SN5 Generally speaking, I accept and carry out my 
friends security ideas and suggestions even 
though they are different from mine. 
  
SN6 Generally speaking, I respect and put into 
practice my friends’ security practices. 
  





My anti-ransomware knowledge sharing with 




My anti-ransomware knowledge sharing with 








My anti-ransomware knowledge sharing with 




My anti-ransomware knowledge sharing with 
other students is a wise move. 
  
Experience of Threat (Tu et al., 
2015) 
‘ inary’ 
EOT1 Have you had a ransomware infection in the 
past? 
  
Self-Efficacy   
 
I could successfully install and use anti-
ransomware software if … 
(Liang & Xue, 
2010) 
0.957 
SE1 … there was no one around to tell me what to 
do 
  
SE2 I had never used a software like it before   
SE3 I had only the software manuals for reference   
SE4 I had seen someone else doing it before trying 
it myself 
  
SE5 I could call someone for help if I got stuck   
SE6 .. someone else helped me get started   
SE7 I had a lot of time to complete the job   
SE8 I had just the built-in help guide for assistance   
SE9 .. someone showed me how to do it first   
SE10 I had used similar software like this one 
before to do the job 
  












RE3 When using anti-ransomware software, a 
computer is more likely to be protected 
 
  







PS1 Ransomware would delete my personal 
information from my computer without my 
knowledge 
  
PS2 Ransomware would invade my privacy   
PS3 My personal information collected by 
ransomware could be misused by cyber 
criminals 
  
PS4 Ransomware could record my Internet 
activities and send them to unknown parties 
  
PS5 My personal information collected by 
ransomware could be subject to unauthorized 
secondary use 
  
PS6 Ransomware would slow down my Internet 
connection 
  
PS7 Ransomware would make my computer run 
more slowly 
  
PS8 Ransomware would cause a system crash on 
my computer from time to time 
  
PS9 Ransomware would affect some of my 
computer programs and make them difficult 
to use 
  
Perceived Susceptibility (Liang & Xue, 
2010) 
0.972 
PSU1 It is extremely likely that my computer will be 
infected by ransomware in the future. 
  
PSU2 My chances of getting ransomware are great.   
PSU3 There is a good possibility that my computer 
will have ransomware. 
  
PSU4 I feel ransomware will infect my computer in 
the future. 
  
PSU5 It is extremely likely that ransomware will 
infect my computer. 
  






AM1 I intend to use anti-ransomware software to 
avoid ransomware 
  
AM2 I predict I would use anti-ransomware 






AM3 I plan to use anti-ransomware software to 
avoid ransomware 
  
AM4 I intend to periodically use anti-ransomware 
software to protect my computer from 
ransomware. 
  
AM5 In the immediate future I intend to customize 
my browser and computer settings to prevent 
the intrusion of ransomware on my computer. 
  
AM6 In the near future, I intend to check my 
computer for the presence of ransomware. 
  
Threat Avoidance Behavior (Liang & Xue, 
2010) 
(Yoon, Hwang, 
& Kim, 2012) 
0.920 
0.75 
TAB1 I run anti-ransomware software regularly to 
remove ransomware from my computer. 
  
TAB2 I update my anti-ransomware software 
regularly. 
  
TAB3 I immediately delete suspicious emails 
without reading them. 
  
TAB4 Under no circumstance would I ever open a 




Survey Instrument Validation 
Once the preliminary survey was developed, the next step was to bring together 4-6 
subject matter experts to be part of the expert review panel. The panel’s main task was to 
validate each survey item’s relevance to the definitions of the constructs (Sireci & 
Faulkner-Bond, 2014). Based on the feedback from the panel, the final wording and 
structure were modified. After recommendations by the panel, the next step was to pilot 
test the survey with 20-25 college students. The goal of the pilot study was to evaluate 
the survey for clarity, ease, and to have an estimate of how much time it took to 
complete. The results of this pilot test were also empirically analyzed to validate the 





(2017), survey instruments should be pilot tested before gathering the main research data. 
The authors argued that a pilot test is the best way to confirm a survey instrument is 
providing unbiased and reliable results.  
 
Data Collection  
The target group from which data was collected are individual students from United 
States universities. The study used a non-probability sampling design, specifically 
judgment sampling which is an extension of the convenience sampling method. This 
method is preferred since data is being gathered from college students (Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2016). Students were invited to participate voluntarily in the study by sending 
invitations with the survey link to public email listservers. One example of these 
listservers is the Hispanic in Computing group through which invitations to participate in 
studies, scholarships, and workshops are constantly shared with hundreds of students 
from universities across the nation. Sending messages through these groups does not 
require special permissions from the owners and at no moment is personally identifiable 
information required as messages are sent to a specific general account that then forwards 
the messages to the group members. The available listservers had a reach of more than 
1,500 students from United States universities.  
In the study by Trespalacios and Perkins (2016), students responded to the online 
invitation on average of 23% to 26%. The authors found no significant difference in 
participation rates between invitations that were personalized or not. Also, Johnston and 
Warkentin (2010) were able to achieve a 40% response rate without giving any 





computer focused email listservers that were targeted are made up of highly engaged 
students that continuously participate in group topics.  
Ringle, Sarstedt, and Straub (2012) argue that to have reliable results when using PLS-
SEM, it is important to have an acceptable level of measurement. Although many 
researchers using PLS-SEM use the rule of ten or five to determine the sample size, this 
calculation should only be used as a rough guideline and should be verified with more 
precise power analysis software or by using Cohen (1992) power tables (Hair, Ringle, & 
Sarstedt, 2011). Although PLS-SEM has demonstrated usefulness with small sample 
sizes, Kante, Chepken, and Oboko (2018) argue that depending on complexity, studies 
using PLS-SEM should have a sample size of at least 200 participants.  
To have an estimate of the sample size, the rule of ten could be used. According to 
Hair Jr, Hult, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2016), the largest number of formative indicators 
measuring a construct would be multiplied by 10. Construct Self-Efficacy has ten 
indicators, resulting in 100 when multiplied by 10. However, to have a precise estimate 
of sample size, the G*Power Version 3 software was used (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007). Using an effect size of 0.25, an error probability of 0.05, and a power of 
0.95, G*Power calculates a sample size of 164 participants. This number is also near the 
number of participants studied in Liang and Xue (2010), 152. Based on all the 









Data Analysis Plan  
The goal was to analyze the data gathered from surveys completed by college 
students for measurement validation and hypothesis testing. The data analysis follows the 
tests and methods used by Liang and Xue (2010) with PLS-SEM.    
Once the data collection phase was complete, the data underwent a pre-analysis data 
screening. During this phase, the collected data were checked for missing data, suspicious 
patterns, outliers, and data distribution. Concerning data distribution, Hair Jr et al. (2016) 
point out that although PLS-SEM does not require normally distributed data, it should 
still be checked in case the data is extremely non-normally distributed. Once the data is 
ready for analysis, SmartPLS3 was used for the main analysis. According to the 
recommendation of Fornell and Bookstein (1982), Partial Least Squares (PLS) is chosen 
as an analysis method because it was found to be more robust when testing complex 
structural models. This method is also useful for the prediction of the impact independent 
variables have on the dependent variable. PLS also has the benefit that a valid analysis 
can be done with smaller sample sizes. In the study by Ringle et al. (2012), 36% of the 
researchers surveyed said they preferred to use PLS because it allowed them to run tests 
in small sample sizes.  
 
Testing Measurement Model 
The goal of the measurement model is to test the relationship between the latent 
variables and the observed data. The validation of the measurement model was performed 
by following the steps taken by Liang and Xue (2010) to determine the convergent and 





validity tests whether constructs that are expected to be related really are related. 
Discriminant validity tests whether constructs that are expected to be unrelated really are 
unrelated. The testing criteria for the convergent construct validity Liang and Xue (2010) 
used was that items should have a higher weight load per item on the hypothesized 
construct when compared to other constructs. While for the discriminant validity test; 
building on the recommendation by Fornell and Bookstein (1982); the criteria used was 
that the square root of the construct’s averaged variance e tracted (AVE) has to be larger 
than the correlations with the other constructs being tested. A PLS confirmatory analysis 
was done to calculate the item loadings and the constructs AVE were calculated. Also, 
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated to measure the internal consistency of the items and if 
the result is over 0.70 then the model has the necessary measurement reliability (Hair Jr 
et al., 2016). Finally, model fitness was determined using the SmartPLS standardized root 
mean square residual method. The method output reveals differences between observed 
and expected model correlations. The model would be considered a good fit if the values 
are between 0.08 and 0.10. 
 
Testing Structural Model 
The study verified how subjective norm, attitude toward knowledge sharing, the 
experience of threat, perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, self-efficacy, and 
response efficacy affect each other. The study used the following as control variables; 
age, gender, and internet experience. The goal of the structural model test was to analyze 





output of the model. The arrows connecting the constructs represent the structural 
hypothesis of the model. 
To determine how constructs affected one another, this study calculated the beta 
coefficients. The beta coefficients of the PLS structural model are also known as the 
standardized regression coefficients. These values are calculated by performing SEM-
PLS analysis on standardized values. This process allowed the analysis of the effect of 
independent variables on the dependent variable even if the data has values in different 
measurement units (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). The R2, path coefficients, and significance 
of the coefficients of the structural relationships were calculated. In PLS-SEM for the 
path coefficient to be significant in a two tailed t-test, the t-value > 1.95. This value gave 
us a p<0.05. These p-values of a structural path can be calculated in SmartPLS through 
the process of bootstrapping (Hair Jr et al., 2016). Bootstrapping is a resampling 
technique that tests the coefficients’ significance.  
 
Resources 
A survey instrument was used to gather the required data. The survey was created 
using the Google Forms application that is part of the Google Docs suite of Office 
Applications. The Google Docs suite of Office Applications is a free web-based 
application. Once the data was gathered, SmartPLS3 and SPSS were used to analyze the 














Pilot Study Expert Panel 
During September and October of 2020, a group of four volunteers with academic 
and professional experience in information system security accepted the invitation to be 
my Expert Panel and evaluate the survey instrument.  
The volunteers were provided with a copy of the dissertation abstract, the survey, and 
a rubric with which to evaluate the survey.  he title of the rubric is “ urvey/Interview 
Validation  ubric for   pert  anel” (V   ). It was created by arilyn  .  immon and 
Jaquelyn White (White & Simon, 2011). The goal of the rubric is to include criteria that 
measure face validity, construct validity, and content validity. The rubric uses a 4-point 
scale ranging from a 1 (Not Acceptable – major modifications needed) to a 4 (Exceeds 
Expectations – no modifications needed). The criteria measured are as follows: clarity, 
wordiness, negative wording, overlapping responses, balance, use of jargon, 
appropriateness of responses listed, use of technical language, application to praxis, 
relationship to the problem, and survey adequately measures each construct. These 
metrics were answered for each individual construct evaluated. The rubric has a total of 
19 criteria. 
The experts evaluated the survey measurement items, and we then discussed their 
thoughts and recommendations about the survey items. Most of the experts scored the 





overlapping responses, clarity, and wordiness. None of the criteria scored in the twos or 
ones or required their recommendations with respect to the validity of the actual 
questions and constructs. The main recommendations focused on making changes to the 
format of the survey, dividing it into pages instead of one long page, and changing words 
in several questions to improve the clarity/readability. One of the experts asked about the 
similarities of two sets of questions and the possibility of removing one of each. 
However, after discussing the goal of the questions and the testing of answer validity, the 
expert did not recommend the removal. To improve clarity and readability, I divided the 
survey into more sections to limit the number of items per page. Also, periods were 
added at the end of each item statement. The experts also recommended the addition of 
two demographic questions: 1) Are you enrolled in a computing related major? 2) Are 
you aware of your University’s I  security policies?  
The four experts are bilingual and have complete fluency in the English language. 
However, they are non-native English speakers. This allowed them to give me additional 
feedback regarding the clarity of the items that a native speaker would not have provided. 
For example, one of the panelists mentioned that the double negative in items AM4 to 
AM6 was difficult to understand and forced her to reread them several times in order to 
understand them. Therefore, it was decided to eliminate these three items and to also 
delete ATKS2. In addition, items TAB3 – TAB6 were moved to Avoidance Motivation. 
As three items from Threat Avoidance Behavior were moved to Avoidance Motivate, 
only two items were left to measure Threat Avoidance Behavior. This required adding 





The data from the rubric was added to SPSS and reliability statistics analyses were 
run. SPSS ran the reliability statistics on 10 of 19 metrics as the other 9 had zero 
variance.  he test calculated a Cronbach’s Alpha based on the standardized items of 
0.708 which means there is an acceptable internal consistency. 
 
Pilot Study Analysis Results 
Between the months of November and December 2020 a pilot study was completed to 
determine flaws in the planned methods and to observe possible response rates. At the 
end of the established pilot study, there were a total of 16 participants in the survey. 
Every single one of the participants filled out all questions. There was no missing data in 
the result file.  
The number of participants was lower than expected. The invitations were sent to 
various email listservs that are known to have high participation rates. It is suspected that 
in situations relating to the Covid-19 pandemic and the highly unusual university 
semesters that were and are currently in session, students might not have been as 
motivated as usual to complete a survey at the end of their semester. The mitigation plan 
was to send the survey to additional listservs along with reminders.  
The pilot study data was added to SPSS. The results of the Descriptive Statistics, the 
Cronbach’s Alpha, and the bar charts with the demographics are shown in Appendix D.  
To test for construct reliability, the Cronbach Alpha of each set of items making up the 
constructs was also calculated. Avoidance motivation resulted in a coefficient of 0.968, 
Attitude Towards Knowledge Sharing had a coefficient of 0.819, Perceived Severity had 





Self- Efficacy of 0.746, Subjective Norm of 0.789, and Threat Avoidance Behavior of 
0.725. Since Experience of Threat has only one item, its coefficient is 1.00. Because all 
the Cronbach Alpha values are greater than 0.7, all of the constructs have internal 
consistencies that are acceptable.  
 
Main Study Analysis Results 
The data for the main study analysis was gathered during the month of March 2021. 
According to the calculation done using G*Power, the recommended minimum number 
of participants was 164. Data were gathered from a total of 174 participants. As seen 
during the pilot test data gathering period, getting the required number of participants was 
no easy task. The combination of hybrid or purely online learning due to the pandemic 
and the different Spring Break Holiday periods throughout United States universities 
during the month of March was a large obstacle to the data-gathering effort. As anecdotal 
reports have observed, students did not seem as motivated as they have been in the past to 
participate in online surveys, although this topic is for a different study that is outside of 
the scope and the domain of the present dissertation. To mitigate the low participation 
rate seen in the pilot study, the invitations were sent to more email distribution listservs 
and an increased number of reminders were sent to invite students to participate in the 
study.  
The data from the main study was added to SPSS for cleanup and pre-analysis tasks. 
The results of the Descriptive  tatistics, the Cronbach’s Alpha, normality, Mahalabonis 
distance and outlier test, and additional charts were added to Appendix E. Table 2 has a 






Demographic Data (N=174) 
Data Items Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Age     
18-25 97 55.7 55.7 
26-35 50 28.7 84.5 
36-45 13 7.5 92.0 
46-55 12 6.9 98.9 
56-65 1 0.6 99.4 
Over 65 1 0.6 100 
Sex (N = 173)    
Male 53 30.6 30.6 
Female 115 66.5 97.1 
Prefer not to say 6 2.9 100 
How many years have you been using the internet? 
5 years or less 4 2.3 2.3 
6-10 years 37 21.3 23.6 
11-15 years 59 33.9 57.5 
Over 15 years 74 42.5 100 
Are you enrolled in a computing-related major?  
Yes 52 29.9 29.9 
No 122 70.1 100 
Are you aware of your University’s IT Security Policies? 
Yes 84 48.3 48.3 
No 90 51.7 100 
 
The age distribution of the survey participants was the following: 97 students out of 





between 36 and 45 years old, 12 were between 46 and 55, one student was between 56-
65, and one was over 65. The sex distribution of the participants was as follows: 53 
students were male, 115 were female, five preferred not to say, and one participant did 
not provide an answer and left it blank. It should be clarified that this was the only 
instance of a blank value in the data set.  
Concerning the question about their years of internet experience, participants 
answered the following: 74 participants said they had over 15 years of internet 
experience, 59 said they had 11-15 years of experience, 37 said they had 6-10 years of 
experience, and four said they had five years or less of internet experience. On the 
question asking if the students were aware of their university’s IT security policies, 90 
answered no and 84 answered yes. Finally, on the question that asked if they were 
enrolled in a computing related major, 122 students said no and 52 said yes.  
As expected, most of the volunteers were traditional college age students in the 18-25 
years old range. However, surprisingly, a substantially larger number of female students 
answered the survey than male students. This could be in part due to the composition of 
the listservs where the survey participation invitations were sent to. Also, a majority of 
students said that they were aware of their universities’ IT security policies. At the same 
time, most of the participants were not from a computer related major. This last detail is 
important because it means that the survey was answered by a more technically diverse 
population than having only computer savvy computer majors answer the survey and 
provides more generalizable answers. 
To test for outlier cases, the Mahalanobis distance was calculated using the linear 





To test for item internal consistency, Cronbach’s Alpha is calculated using SPSS. All 
variables except for Experience of Threat were tested as this variable is Boolean. All 
variables except for Threat Avoidance Behavior were above the threshold of 0.700 to 
satisfy the reliability test. However, Cronbach’s Alpha for  hreat Avoidance  ehavior 
was 0.692 which is close to the 0.700 thresholds.  he data for Cronbach’s Alpha can be 
observed in Table 3.  
Table 3 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Variable Number of Items Cronbach’s Alpha 
Attitude Towards Knowledge Sharing 4 0.876 
Subjective Norm 6 0.784 
Response Efficacy 3 0.895 
Self-Efficacy 10 0.842 
Perceived Severity 9 0.923 
Perceived Susceptibility 5 0.884 
Avoidance Motivation 6 0.928 
Threat Avoidance Behavior 4 0.692 
 
The main data analysis was done using SmartPLS. The goal of the first part of the 
analysis with SmartPLS is to test the measurement model. More information on 
bootstrapping can be found in Chapter  ’s section on  esting  tructural odels. In these 
analyses, bootstrapping was performed to assess the path coefficients’ significance by 
resampling the collected data. SmartPLS is configured to do 2,000 subsamples during the 
bootstrapping procedure and then subsequently performed factor analysis. Once the 





relationships of the survey measurement items to corresponding constructs in the model. 
The result tells us how much an item contributes to the construct to which it has been 
assigned. This process is iterative and is run several times until only items that have outer 
loading values over 0.7 remain. Each model construct was further dissected into survey 
statement items and each of these items was tested independently within the model 
construct. All survey statement items were identified to be significantly different from 
null expectations. The loadings reported in Table 4 are the regression coefficients to the 
scores upon which the t-statistics are calculated. Loading values of about 0.7 are 
considered to explain more than 50% of the indicator’s variance. Any items that were 
identified as having a loading value below 0.7 were excluded from further analyses. The 
calculated p-values were used to accept or reject the null hypotheses with respect to the 
measurement model test. It was observed that the t-statistic values were consistent across 
model constructs except for four self-efficacy items and two of the perceived severity 
Items. However, the variance in these two constructs did not change the associated p-
values.  
Table 4 
Measurement Model Testing Results 
Construct Item Loading t-statistics p-values 
Subjective Norm SN1 0.877 27.941 < 0.001 
SN2 0.922 42.955 < 0.001 
SN3 0.887 54.820 < 0.001 




ATTKS1 0.827 23.982 < 0.001 
ATTKS2 0.867 29.630 < 0.001 
ATTKS3 0.894 40.830 < 0.001 









SE3 0.710 3.313 < 0.001 
SE4 0.820 4.478 < 0.001 
SE8 0.858 4.512 < 0.001 




RE1 0.917 46.347 < 0.001 
RE2 0.921 54.331 < 0.001 







PS4 0.727 6.858 < 0.001 
PS5 0.702 6.553 < 0.001 
PS6 0.886 20.783 < 0.001 
PS7 0.900 17.763 < 0.001 
PS8 0.919 18.529 < 0.001 




PSU1 0.715 12.207 < 0.001 
PSU2 0.834 20.773 < 0.001 
PSU3 0.849 28.751 < 0.001 
 PSU4 0.871 26.063 < 0.001 







AM1 0.893 46.163 < 0.001 
AM2 0.859 32.238 < 0.001 
AM3 0.902 43.404 < 0.001 
AM4 0.865 23.508 < 0.001 
AM5 0.833 30.854 < 0.001 
AM6 0.796 25.489 < 0.001 
Threat Avoidance Behavior TAB1 0.929 64.923 < 0.001 
TAB2 0.910 38.421 < 0.001 






Before the PLS test is run to test the structural model, the discriminant validity should 
be verified using the Fornell-Larcker Criterion. As shown by the results in Table 5 all are 
within the correct ranges and demonstrate that no two constructs are correlating and are 
measuring correctly different concepts correctly. 
Table 5 
Discriminant Validity 
 ATTK AM EOT PS PSU RE SE SN TAB 
TTK 0.854         
AM 0.262 0.859        
EOT -0.186 -0.176 1       
PS -0.012 0.015 -0.227 0.838      
PSU 0.2 0.318 -0.191 0.045 0.83     
RE 0.163 0.338 -0.019 0.08 0.064 0.909    
SE 0.018 0.156 -0.002 0.117 -0.201 0.216 0.779   
SN 0.518 0.102 -0.05 0.056 0.125 0.093 0.141 0.896  
TAB 0.148 0.648 -0.122 0.058 0.316 0.171 0.011 0.084 0.9191 
 
Table 6 shows the composite reliability calculated through SmartPLS. All of the 
composite reliabilities are within the acceptable parameters of greater than 0.700. 
Table 6 
Composite Reliability 
Relationship Composite Reliability 
Threat Avoidance Behavior 0.916 
Subjective Norm 0.924 
Self-Efficacy 0.860 
Response Efficacy 0.934 





Perceived Severity 0.934 
Experience of Threat 1 
Avoidance Motivation 0.944 
Attitude Towards Knowledge Sharing 0.915 
 
Since the measurement model is satisfied for PLS-SEM analysis, the structural model 
was used to test the hypotheses. Figure 2 shows the PLS-SEM model with the appropriate 
R-squared values. The 42% variance of threat avoidance behavior is explained by the 
constructs in the research model. Table 7 shows the path coefficients for the model. In 
this table I can evaluate the p-values for the different relationships in the model. The 
model shows that the relationship between subjective norm and response efficacy is not 
significant. Equally significant relationships are found between perceived susceptibility 
and avoidance motivation and response-efficacy and avoidance motivation. 
 
Figure 2. PLS-SEM Analysis Result 
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H1 is supported as subjective norm has a positive effect on attitude towards 
knowledge sharing (β   0.518, p < .001). H2 is not supported as experience of threat did 
not have a positive effect on perceived severity (β   -0.227, p < .001). The coefficient is 
negative, indicating the relationship is negative. H3 is not supported as experience of 
Threat had a negative effect on perceived susceptibility, because the coefficient is 
negative (β   -0.159, p = 0.062). H4 is supported as attitude towards knowledge sharing 
had a positive, although small, effect on perceived susceptibility (β   0.0.17, p = .05). H5 
is not supported as the positive effect of subjective norm on response efficacy was found 
to be minimal and of no significance (β   0.093, p = 0.211). H6 is not supported as a 
negative effect measured between perceived severity and avoidance motivation was not 
of significance (β   -0.043, p = 0.542). H7 is supported as there is a positive and 
significant effect of perceived susceptibility on avoidance motivation (β   0.336, p < 
.001). H8 is not supported as there is a positive effect by self-efficacy on avoidance 
motivation and the level of significance nears the significant threshold (β   0.167, p = 
0.059). H9 is supported as response efficacy was found to have a positive effect on 
avoidance motivation (β   0.284, p < .001). H10 is supported as avoidance motivation 
was found to have a positive effect on threat avoidance behavior (β   0.648, p < .001).  
Table 7 
Structural Model Testing Results 








Subjective Norm →  
Attitude Towards 
Knowledge Sharing 
0.518 8.967 < 0.001 Supported 
H2 
Experience Of Threat→ 
Perceived Severity 
































H3 Experience Of Threat→  
Perceived Susceptibility 











0.093 1.252 0.211 
Not 
Supported 
H6 Perceived Severity→ 
Avoidance Motivation 
-0.043 0.061 0.542 
Not 
Supported 
H7 Perceived Susceptibility→ 
Avoidance Motivation 




0.167 1.893 0.059 
Not 
Supported 
H9 Response Efficacy →  
Avoidance Motivation 
0.284 4.368 < 0.001 Supported 
H10 
Avoidance Motivation →  
Threat Avoidance Behavior 







  Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Conclusions 
The goal of this dissertation research was to empirically examine threat avoidance 
behavior in the context of ransomware security incidents among college students. This 
was done by extending the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory with the addition of the 
factors subjective norm, attitude toward knowledge sharing, and experience of threat. 
These factors were chosen to determine whether social pressures and previous 
experiences of threat can influence avoidance behavior.  
Data for this study was gathered from 174 participants in United States colleges 
during March of 2021. During the testing of the measurement model using SmartPLS, it 
was observed that various constructs had items with outer loadings that were under the  
0.7 threshold (Hair Jr et al., 2016). These items were removed, and the analysis was run 
again. This procedure improved the model analysis.  
The research also had seven research questions. Concerning the first question, 
subjective norm was observed to have a positive effect on attitude towards knowledge 
sharing. People with higher levels of subjective norm would be more likely to share their 
knowledge about ransomware infections with friends. In the second question, experience 
of threat had negative effects on both constructs that make up perceived threat; perceived 





positive effect on perceived threat, however it did not. This unexpected result deserves 
further study in the future. The third question concerns the effect of attitude towards 
knowledge sharing on perceived threat. The results revealed that a positive but small 
effect on perceived susceptibility. In the fourth question, subjective norm was observed to 
have no significant effect on response efficacy. The fifth question concerns the effect of 
perceived threat on avoidance motivation. Perceived threat is made up of perceived 
severity and perceived susceptibility. The research showed that only one of the 
constructs, perceived susceptibility, had a positive effect on avoidance motivation; while 
perceived severity had a minimal negative effect that is not significant. The sixth question 
is about the effect of coping appraisal on avoidance motivation. Coping appraisal is made 
up of the constructs self-efficacy and response efficacy. The research showed that only 
one of the constructs had a positive effect on avoidance motivation. However, the effect 
of response efficacy was significant, while the effect of self-efficacy was small and of no 
significance. The last question is about how avoidance motivation affects threat 
avoidance behavior. The research showed that avoidance motivation had a strongly 
significant effect on threat avoidance behavior.  
Of the 10 hypotheses, five of them were not supported by the results: H2, H3, H5, 
H6, and H8. H2 stated that experience of threat would have a positive effect on perceived 
severity while H3 stated that experience of threat would have a positive effect on 
perceived susceptibility. However, the observed effect was the opposite. H2 and H3 were 
based on (Tu et al., 2015). This study argued that individuals that underwent through 
some kind of threat would then become hypervigilant about that threat in case it appeared 





positively associated with both constructs that make up perceived threat. However, in my 
research, the opposite relationship was observed; experience of threat had a negative 
effect on both constructs that make up perceived threat. This demonstrates that there 
might be a problem with the items used to measure the constructs that produced an 
unexpected result. 
H5 stated that subjective norm would have a positive effect on response efficacy. 
Again, the effect observed in this relationship was the opposite. Tu et al. (2015) argued 
that social influences directly influence an individual’s coping intentions. Chi et al. 
(2012) observed that subjective norm would have a greater effect on individuals who 
perceived risk. However the contradiction with my findings could be related to what was 
observed by Chua (1980). That study found that subjective norm does influence 
individual behaviors, but the author found a very particular caveat. The effect would be 
observed mostly in individuals who had little experience and had yet to adopt a particular 
attitude or mindset. This is an important detail because 42% of the survey participants 
said that they had over 15 years of internet experience. This large amount of experience 
could have affected the relationship between subjective norm and response efficacy since 
people with more experience are less affected by subjective norm.  
H6 stated that Perceived Severity would have a positive effect on avoidance 
motivation. However, the opposite was observed. Liang and Xue (2010) observed that 
perceived threat had a positive effect on avoidance motivation. perceived threat is 
composed of the constructs perceived severity and perceived susceptibility. In this study, 
only perceived severity had a negative effect while perceived susceptibility had a positive 





H8 stated that self-efficacy would have a positive effect on avoidance motivation. In 
this study, the effect of self-efficacy was small and not significant. Liang and Xue (2010) 
observed that coping appraisal had a positive effect on avoidance motivation. Coping 
appraisal is composed of the constructs self-efficacy and response efficacy. In this study, 
self-efficacy had a small effect on avoidance motivation that was not of significance, 
while response efficacy had a larger and significant positive effect.  
Although avoidance motivation had the expected effect as seen in previous research 
that validated the model used, it is interesting to observe that perceived threat and coping 
appraisal did not produce results as expected. Previous research stated that both 
constructs would have a positive effect on avoidance motivation, but this was not the 
result. Only one of the two constructs that make up each one was found to have a 
significant and positive effect on avoidance motivation.  
Also, the constructs that were added to the Liang and Xue (2010) had mixed results. 
subjective norm was not found to have a strong or significant effect on response efficacy. 
This could be caused by the fact that 42% of survey participants were experienced and 
the more experience a person is, the less they are affected by subjective norm (Chua, 
1980). However, subjective norm did behave as expected with a strong positive effect on 
attitude toward knowledge sharing. This last construct had a significant but weak positive 
effect on perceived susceptibility. The biggest outlier was experience of threat. It was 
expected that this construct would have a strong and significant effect on perceived 







Implications and Recommendations 
Ransomware is becoming an increasing threat to information system users. At the 
same time, college students have been largely ignorant of their relative risk for becoming 
victims of ransomware infections. This study expanded the TTAT to better understand 
the perceptions and behaviors of college students towards ransomware threats by using 
three additional features: subjective norm, attitude toward knowledge sharing, and 
experience of threat. The TTAT explains how individual IT users engage in threat 
avoidance behaviors. The study validated the effect of avoidance motivation on threat 
avoidance behavior as seen in previous TTAT literature. Also, response efficacy and 
perceived susceptibility was found to have the expected effects on avoidance motivation. 
However, perceived severity and self-efficacy did not behave as expected. While 
Experience of threat had a significant and negative effect on perceived severity, self-
efficacy was not affected by any of the extending features. The unexpected results in 
some of the constructs should be studied further to determine why the behavior was so 
different in comparison to the literature.  
The study showed that attitude towards knowledge sharing increased perceived 
susceptibility, which then leads to avoidance motivation. This suggests that even in 
students with high levels of inherent knowledge about threat avoidance, perceived 
susceptibility was sufficient to have a positive effect in threat avoidance behavior. In 
addition, this study found that several of the proposed hypotheses were supported. 
Subjective norm was observed to have a positive effect on attitude towards knowledge 





threat avoidance behaviors, although this could have biased the expectations that they 
might be more significantly influenced by subjective norms.  
This study provides clear information on how college students understand the risk of 
ransomware to their computer systems, how they obtain knowledge about risk, identify 
threats within their surroundings, and how they avoid those risks.  
 
Limitations and Future Studies 
The scope of this research was limited to the study of threat avoidance behavior of 
United States college students in the context of ransomware infections. Inviting only 
students from the United States affects the generalization. First, other countries have 
different threat levels of ransomware infection; be it because of less computer security 
knowledge or different availability of software tools to protect the systems. Also, 
different countries may have various levels of threat avoidance behavior as there are 
different levels of risk behaviors among societies. 
Another limitation of the study was the data collection method. The data was 
collected as a web-based survey. Web based surveys have several biases such as self-
selection, desirability, and acquiescence bias. And lastly, a limitation that cannot be 
ignored is the time frame during which the data was gathered. Starting in the year 2020, 
the world has been operating under the stress and preoccupation of the Covid-19 
pandemic. The pandemic forced governments to order shutdowns including the closure of 
on-site college education in most of the world. This has changed how students work and 
learn. It can be surmised that the constant presence of Covid-19 on students’ minds may 





second it may have affected the answers of those who volunteered and completed the 
survey. It is possible that some of the answers would have been different during a less 
stressful time for the survey volunteers.  
 
Summary 
The main objective of this research was to examine threat avoidance behavior in the 
context of ransomware security incidents among college students by way of extending an 
existing framework, the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory. The introduction of the 
study provided background and foundation for the domain and the research problem that 
the study focuses on. Hypotheses were developed based on the research question and a 
research model was proposed. Barriers and limitations which the research could face 
were also discussed and possible mitigations were presented.  
This research extends the TTAT with the constructs subjective norm, attitude toward 
knowledge sharing, and experience of threat. Based on previous studies, the research 
investigated what effect these factors have on threat avoidance behavior. These factors 
determine if externalities such as social pressures or previous experiences of threat 
influence avoidance behavior. The literature review compiles the constructs of the 
proposed model, gaps in the body of knowledge, and contributions from previous studies. 
The Methodology Chapter compiles the research design. It was determined that a 
quantitative and empirical study using a non-probability design was the best approach for 
this research. The survey item was designed using the 7-point Likert Scale and the 
convenience sampling method was used to collect data. This chapter also discusses the 





strategy. The survey instrument was given to a panel of experts to review for clarity, 
application, and validation that the items measured the constructs adequately. After 
approval by the panel of experts, a pilot study was conducted to perform item reliability 
tests, determine flaws in the data collection method, and observe the possible participant 
response rates. Data analysis was then completed with the use of SmartPLS 3.0 and 
SPSS. These statistical and modeling tools were used to test for factor analysis, construct 
reliability and validity, measurement model, and structural model. The results and 
analyses of these tests were presented in Chapter 4 and the Appendices. The analysis of 
the statistical results was then used to reject or support the hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents 
the study conclusions, the implications and recommendations, limitations, and possible 
future research.  
The study brought into focus a particular sector of user that is not usually studied, 
college students. The results provide a better understanding of college students’ threat 
avoidance behavior in the face of ransomware infections. It also concluded with 
unexpected results. Some of the hypotheses were not supported as was expected based on 
previous literature. Future studies should focus on why the results of previous studies in 
other population demographics and sectors were so different when applied in the context 
of college students. Also, the results provided insight into the technical experience 
students have, their knowledge of university IT security policies, and differences among 
computing and non-computing students. The results of the study shed light on an 
important population that is not studied enough in the context of ransomware attacks and 
how they respond or act to prevent the infections. It is interesting that some results were 





ignored that the stresses affecting students since March 2020 due to the Covid-19 
pandemic may have affected their answers. More studies should be made to better 
understand how subjective norm affects a lesser experienced population and its 
relationship with attitude toward knowledge sharing after the pandemic is under control 
and students go back to the normal daily circumstances. Finally, further study is 
necessary to determine why the experience of threat did not have the expected strong 
effect on perceived threat and if this may have to do with the impulsivity and risk taking 
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Clarity  1.000  1.000  -.577  -.577  -.333 
Wordiness  1.000  1.000  -.577  -.577  -.333 
Negative_Wording  -.577  -.577  1.000  .000  .577 
Overlapping_Responses  -.577  -.577  .000  1.000  .577 
Appropriateness_of_Repon 
ses_Listed 
-.333  -.333  .577  .577  1.000 
Measure_of_Construct_ET  -.333  -.333  .577  .577  1.000 
Measure_of_Construct_PS 
U 
-.333  -.333  .577  .577  1.000 
Measure_of_Construct_PS  -.333  -.333  .577  .577  1.000 
Measure_of_Construct_RE  -.333  -.333  -.577  .577  -.333 
Measure_of_Construct_TA 
B 
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